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Acting (and thinking) globally
Come June, European and world 
leaders engage in a chain of top-level 
meetings that are expected to ad-
dress the common challenges we are 
all confronted with, and which cul-
minate with the UN General Assem-
bly in September. The summit sea-
son, however, does not end with the 
autumn: the “flat” world of the XXI 
century requires a quasi-permanent 
consultation process among key 
players – a process that goes well 
beyond the sphere of professional 
diplomats and involves political and 
business leaders, dealing rooms, 
non-governmental organisations 
and, of course, the media (old and 
new).
Does all this amount to a new model 
of “global governance” – however 
embryonic – for the decades ahead? 
Yes and No. Yes, because the vari-
able geometry of summits shows 
how much more diffuse and sectoral 
“power” has become today. And 
No, because the international system 
remains fragmented, unstable, and in 
a state of flux.
The old world order is long gone. 
The multilateralist revival of the 
mid-late 1990s – epitomised by the 
WTO (1994), the Kyoto Protocol 
(1997), the International Criminal 
Court (1998) and the UN Millen-
nium Declaration (2000) – has not 
lived up to the expectations it raised. 
The US “unilateral moment” is also 
a thing of the past now. In turn, new 
or alternative trends struggle to es-
tablish themselves.
Take the BRICs: when Goldman 
Sachs Chief Economist Jim O’Neill 
first coined the acronym, in 2001, 
few expected it would capture the 
world’s attention and, above all, turn 
into a specific summit format (as it 
has done recently). 
When 08/08/08 happened – namely 
the day, on 8 August 2008, when the 
war in Georgia broke out and the 
Beijing Olympics were solemnly in-
augurated – a new era of Russian 
and Chinese assertiveness seemed to 
be on the cards.
The ensuing financial crisis and its 
economic repercussions have some-
what tamed the re-energized Russian 
bear. Now that it feels less threat-
ened in Georgia and Ukraine but 
more vulnerable economically, Mos-
cow appears more prone to reassess-
ing its priorities and long-term pros-
pects. The Katyn tragedy of last 
April should also be remembered as 
an effort at Polish-Russian recon-
ciliation that was long overdue, and 
which can only benefit EU-Russia 
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relations at large and the freshly launched 
"partnership for modernisation".
Yet the crisis has weakened the “West” much 
more than the “rest”, accelerating trends and de-
velopments that were already taking shape previ-
ously. Transatlantic relations are still central for 
both sides, but are much less central for manag-
ing the international system. To a certain extent, 
they even represent a catalyst for opposition and 
alternative groupings. Last December, in Copen-
hagen, the so-called BASIC countries (with 
South Africa replacing Russia) were indeed call-
ing the shots, co-opting America and marginalis-
ing Europe.
The growing importance of the G-20 is the most 
obvious effect of all this: taken together, its 
twenty-something participants account for 87 % 
of world GDP. Behind the aggregate data, how-
ever, lurks a momentous shift: according to a 
recent OECD study, industrialised countries still 
make for 51 % of world GDP (as compared to 
60 in 1990), but their share is expected to drop 
to 43 % by 2030.
Just a BIT?
This said, not all emerging powers – most of 
which happen to be also “strategic partners” of 
the EU – are equal. Apart from its considerable 
energy reserves, Russia displays a number of 
structural weaknesses and is, after all, quite an 
‘old’ power. China is currently enjoying the best 
of both worlds – as an established player with a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council and 
as a virtual leader (and occasionally model) for 
the developing world, as both a status quo and a 
revisionist power  – but may soon be confronted 
with the dilemmas generated by such dual role.
The real challenge for the “West” in general (and 
the EU in particular) may come, however, from 
those emerging countries that see themselves as 
critical stakeholders with growing economic and 
political clout but without adequate recognition 
and representation in the current international 
system.
Brazil, India and Turkey are, arguably, the most 
significant among them. They are all big and 
populous democratic countries, and all with 
strong historical, cultural and economic ties to 
Europe. While they qualify for being partners of 
the “West” on many accounts, however, they are 
also dissatisfied with the current international 
set-up, be it in the UNSC, the WTO negotia-
tions, or energy-related matters – and Turkey 
also with its status and standing in the Euro-
Atlantic community.
What happened recently with the joint Turkish-
Brazilian initiative on Iran and their dissenting 
vote on sanctions in the Security Council seems 
to vindicate (along with India’s own record on 
non-proliferation) the old saying whereby 
“where you stand depends on where you sit” –
or not.
Too many Europeans – too little EU
The problem they raise is particularly painful for 
Europe, which is instead largely over-represented 
in all international bodies, formal and informal. 
In fact, Europeans make for half of the G-8, up 
to 1/3 of seats on the UNSC and in the G-20, 
and roughly 1/3 of votes in the IMF and the 
World Bank.
This hardly corresponds to the realities of the 
early XXI century, let alone those that are loom-
ing large on the horizon. And if both emerging 
and fellow old powers complain that there are 
too many Europeans around the table, we should 
in turn complain ourselves that there is too little 
EU – and even that little is, more often than not, 
under-performing.
Trading less presence for more influence –
which can only come from speaking with a single 
voice – is becoming the overarching imperative 
for the Union and its member states. The trouble 
is that this will not come cost-free. For most 
European countries, relinquishing a place in the 
sun and/or voting rights on a board is a matter 
of national pride and could only be accepted if 
others do it to a comparable extent.
Moreover, bringing some order and logic into the 
Union's representation in the maze of international 
organizations and conventions Europeans are part 
of constitutes a challenge in its own right (as the 
Table prepared by CEPS and reproduced in this 
issue tries to show). Such a “patchwork” Europe –
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itself the combined result of pre-existing legal com-
petences, political constraints, precedents, ad hoc 
arrangements, and widespread reluctance to over-
haul it – is a recipe for confusion, frustration, and 
ineffectiveness. Yet the costs for Europe may turn 
out to be substantial also in terms of concrete inter-
ests and trade-offs.
Managing interdependence
Tom Friedman’s “flat” world is one characterised 
by interdependence and global real-time commu-
nication. Yet interdependence exists not only 
among geographical areas but also among policy 
issues. Climate change can hardly be tackled ef-
fectively without addressing also energy- and 
trade-related problems. Migration flows cannot 
be governed without adequate development- and 
human security-related actions. Financial regula-
tion can hardly succeed in one country (or conti-
nent) alone, and it requires coordinated interven-
tion on a large scale. Nuclear non-proliferation 
initiatives need to be credibly linked with shared 
approaches to energy security. And durable peace 
cannot be secured without justice and reconcilia-
tion.
The existing international institutions, however, 
seem incapable of connecting all these dots. Mul-
tilateral bodies are too specialised and too frag-
mented. The WTO “does” trade; the IMF “does” 
finance; various UN agencies and the World 
Bank “do” development; the UNSC “does” 
peace and security, and the IAEA “does” non-
proliferation. 
On top of that, an international community of 
almost 200 sovereign states makes it increasingly 
difficult to render such multilateralism truly ef-
fective: from Copenhagen itself to the UN Hu-
man Rights Council, the number of veto holders 
and potential spoilers has grown dramatically, 
and the traditional system of global governance is 
now under strain.
In a way, the policy challenges of the coming years 
can be formalised into a series of inter-related equa-
tions with a rising number of unknowns. In virtually 
all equations, Europe may have to give something in 
order to achieve its goals, while emerging powers 
want to get something before they may consider 
giving. The US, in turn, still seems to be the only 
factor that is central across the entire (black) board, 
although it no longer is and acts as a fully independ-
ent variable.
Mini- vs. multilateral?
Here lies the rationale for the emergence of what 
'Foreign Policy' editor Moises Naïm recently 
called – retrieving an old concept of international 
relations – “mini-lateralism”, and the President of 
the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard 
Haass labelled as “elite” or “functional” multilat-
eralism: that is, loose ad hoc coalitions of the 
willing and relevant countries aimed to address 
specific problems.
The G-20, yet again, has become the most impor-
tant and arguably the most comprehensive of 
them all – although not the only one. It remains 
to be seen whether it will manage to evolve into a 
sort of “global governing board” and, if so, with 
what knock-on/collateral effects on existing mul-
tilateral bodies – starting with the UN.
Europeans are quite familiar with “mini-
lateralism”, if anything because they tend to prac-
tise it themselves, both inside and outside the 
Union. Europeans can also be good at connect-
ing the dots and striking deals across the policy 
board: the EU is meant to do precisely that for 
and with its member states; and the so-called 
“community method” used to be the key means 
to that end. With the Lisbon Treaty, they now 
have also a better template for a more coherent 
and incisive external action and international 
presence – provided they do not waste the op-
portunity it offers.
The European Commission recently set up an 
internal working group of Directors General to 
reflect notably on global governance in light of 
the new Treaty. Come September, the European 
Council will devote an extraordinary meeting –
open also to the 27 Foreign Ministers – to dis-
cussing relations with all EU “strategic partners”. 
This issue of BEPA Monthly – along with other 
activities BEPA already has in the pipeline – in-
tends to feed the debate and offer insights from 
think tanks and external experts.
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Global governance – the collective management of 
common problems at the international level – is at 
a delicate juncture. The growing number of issues 
on the international agenda (and their complexity) 
is outpacing the ability of international organiza-
tions to cope. As power spreads to new state and 
non-state actors, no individual country is in a posi-
tion to lead reform on its own. 
This challenges not only the EU and the US but 
also the emerging powers, as they rise in an in-
creasingly interdependent system marked by in-
terconnected risks. Reform of global governance 
needs to match far-reaching change in the inter-
national system. Failure to do so could pave the 
way to unrestrained competition and pervasive 
instability.
A changing international agenda
The international agenda is a moving target. Suc-
cessive ‘generations’ of global challenges have 
been piling up and compounding each other. 
The cumulative impact of emerging issues, cou-
pled with longstanding ones, generates hazards 
and risks that cannot be easily contained.
Three features of globalization are driving de-
mands for more effective global governance: 
deepening interdependence, cross-cutting policy 
issues, and the combination between domestic 
politics and international talks.
The rise of China, India, Brazil, and other fast-
growing economies has taken interdependence 
to new levels. Trade and investment patterns 
have diversified and resulted in value chains 
spread across different countries and continents. 
Financial imbalances between deficit and surplus 
countries have contributed to trigger the crisis 
and remain central to any lasting solution.
Deepening interdependence goes far beyond the 
purely economic dimension to encompass environ-
mental and energy issues. The multiple links among 
climate change, the economic crisis, and state fragil-
ity – “hubs” of risk for the future – illustrate the 
interconnected nature of the challenges on today’s 
international agenda.
Many of these issues involve interwoven domes-
tic and foreign elements. The roots of the finan-
cial crisis, for example, involve domestic policies 
with large-scale international repercussions. Cli-
mate change is another example of an issue 
where domestic priorities need to be reconciled 
with broader international goals. With economic 
growth declining in many countries, national 
politics will increasingly create tight constraints 
on international cooperation – and reduce the 
scope for compromise.
A shifting balance of power(s)
The progressive shift towards a “multi-polar” 
world is complicating the prospects for effective 
global governance. Today, the legitimacy and 
credibility of the US and the EU as political lead-
ers is openly questioned by other players and 
large swathes of the international community. 
This owes in part to their perceived shortcom-
ings in providing the public goods they guaran-
teed up till recently, and in part to the view that 
their positions on e.g. trade and climate change 
are unfair to the interests of others. 
The expanding power assets of emerging coun-
tries help to reinforce their influence. Building 
on economic success, their message resonates 
well beyond their borders. Yet power is not only 
shifting from established to emerging powers 
(and to some extent the developing world) but 
also toward non-state actors – be they agents or 
spoilers of cooperation.
In such more heterogeneous international sys-
tem, diverse views on global governance and in-
ternational cooperation coexist. As a result, it is 
increasingly difficult to separate a functional ap-
proach to collective problem-solving from genu-
inely political considerations. Some emerging and 
many developing countries are reluctant to en-
dorse the very concept of global governance, 
1 Global governance in transition1
By Giovanni Grevi*
* Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
1 This article draws on the findings of the joint EUISS-NIC (National Intelligence Council, USA) project 
‘Global Governance 2025’.
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which is perceived as a “Western” narrative. The 
North-South divide still features high in the 
worldviews of India and Brazil as well as many 
African states. Respective assessments of 
‘fairness’ and ‘equanimity’ in international trade 
and environmental negotiations – or ‘security’ 
proper – often diverge. This is also a conse-
quence of the strong domestic focus of most 
emerging and developing countries, driven by 
the imperative of growth, at a time when the EU 
and the US are also turning more introverted.
In other words, sovereignty seems to be alive 
and kicking. The proud assertion by individual 
countries and, in particular, large powers, of their 
sovereign prerogatives is a notable trend of the 
last few years. While their domestic political sys-
tems widely differ, the US, Russia, China and 
India – among others – share an ingrained suspi-
cion for global governance mechanisms that 
could impinge on their own sovereignty.
On balance, major powers subscribe to forms of 
international cooperation and supervision that 
they regard as embodying their interests or, at 
least, not directly damaging them. Such a selec-
tive approach, however, is running into trouble 
because the number of those who can afford 
picking and choosing is growing.
This leads to the imperative of addressing the ten-
sion between inclusiveness and effectiveness in 
multilateral frameworks – which, in turn, goes to 
the heart of the legitimacy question. The current 
US administration insists on the need to devise 
pragmatic solutions to achieve results. For its part, 
the EU seeks a difficult balancing act between 
“mini-lateralism” and multilateralism. On the other 
hand, most emerging powers and much of the de-
veloping world put a strong emphasis on more in-
clusive and better representative institutions as the 
core condition for their genuine engagement. 
At any rate, unease with what are often regarded 
as “Western” norms and regimes has not trans-
lated so far in an alternative master plan to exist-
ing institutions and seems unlikely to do so in 
the foreseeable future. Alignments are likely to 
be, more than ever, issue-dependent. China and 
India are on the same side when negotiating CO2
emissions reductions but on opposite fronts re-
garding the reform of the UN Security Council. 
Russia and Brazil may join forces (in the BRIC 
format) to advocate new frameworks of global 
economic governance but have gone separate 
ways on the sensitive Iranian nuclear dossier. 
Such “variable geometry” undermines for the 
moment prospects for grand bargains on a new 
set-up for global governance.
Adaptation and innovation
Institutions have somewhat adapted as new is-
sues have emerged. These adaptations have been 
spurred as much by outside forces as by the in-
stitutions themselves.
Three types of innovation are of particular interest 
as pointers for the future: a) the emergence of in-
formal groupings of leading countries, such as the 
G-20; b) regional cooperation, notably in East Asia; 
and c) the contribution of non-state actors to insti-
tutional adaptation. These innovations cannot serve 
as alternatives to law-based, inclusive multilateral 
institutions that can deliver those public goods that 
summits, non-state actors, and regional groupings 
cannot supply (at least in a reliable way). These in-
clude decisions enjoying universal legitimacy; 
mechanisms for implementation and monitoring of 
national measures; and, in sectors like trade, instru-
ments to resolve disputes.
Looking ahead, neither traditional frameworks nor 
new forms of cooperation alone are likely to solve 
global governance problems. However, the two can 
complement one another. Future progress in inter-
national cooperation is likely to take place at the 
interface between old and new, formal and infor-
mal, governmental and non-governmental, global 
and regional governance frameworks.
Informal groupings. The proliferation of regular 
summit-level meetings held outside global (or 
regional) institutions is the most visible feature. 
The G-8 and especially the G-20 have already 
significantly affected global governance, with 
their emphasis on networked coordination of 
national policies and on deliverables.
The development of such ‘Gs’ responds to two 
basic needs: to foster collective leadership to 
jointly address common problems; and to reflect 
the changing balance of world power. At a time 
of profound change in international relations, 
summit diplomacy serves the important purposes 
of familiarising leaders with one another and 
building trust and confidence among them.
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Informal groupings may be increasingly called 
upon to serve as top-level international agenda-
setting bodies, as the G-20 did in coping with the 
fallout of the financial crisis. In perspective, such 
groupings can play an important bridging role 
between bilateral partnerships, mini-lateral for-
mats and multilateral frameworks.
A debate is under way on whether the G-20 
should enlarge its remit further, thus becoming a 
sort of informal global governance “hub.” How-
ever, many observers argue that the G-20 would 
suffer from a “capacity deficit” in dealing with a 
broader agenda. Furthermore, when informal 
groupings are too small, their legitimacy is ques-
tioned; when they are relatively large, (like the G-
20), doubts emerge as to their internal cohesion, 
while their legitimacy remains contested.
Regional cooperation. While no definitive trend can 
be detected, some progress toward closer coop-
eration at the regional level has been achieved 
over the last decade in regions as diverse as 
South America, Africa and, most notably, East 
Asia.
Over the next decades, regional cooperation 
could make further strides due to a mix of fac-
tors. First, there is growing dissatisfaction with 
the performance of global institutions. Second, 
relative power is shifting at regional level too; 
pre-eminent actors such as China, Japan, and 
Brazil have chosen to work through regional co-
operative frameworks to manage political differ-
ences and confirm their leadership. Third, the 
global financial crisis has hit all regions and am-
plified both the suspicion of external interfer-
ence and a sense of self-reliance in addressing 
economic and political challenges.
The key question is whether regionalism will 
prove to be a building block of global govern-
ance or a drain on it.
Non-state actors. Such actors as non-governmental 
organizations, networks of experts, and business 
are playing a central role both on the ‘demand’ 
and ‘supply’ sides of global governance. They 
contribute to setting the international agenda and 
are essential partners in implementing solutions.
Private philanthropy, often associated with busi-
ness and civil society initiatives or public authori-
ties, has made an important difference in areas 
such as health and education. Hybrid, public-
private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an 
important ingredient of innovation, notably in 
the field of sustainable development. Their rele-
vance is likely to grow as they reach out to multi-
ple stakeholders.
Non-state actors have been at least as effective 
as states at reframing issues and mobilising pub-
lics – a trend that seems set to continue. The In-
ternational Criminal Court and Landmines Ban 
Treaties were both led by civil society actors and 
supported by like-minded states.
In addition to their role as agenda setters, non-
state actors are essential sources of knowledge 
and expertise. Expertise is becoming more sali-
ent in all fields of international policymaking, 
from managing the implications of technological 
innovation to food and resource scarcity – all 
issues that require constant monitoring. 
The challenge of reform
Short of determined action to reverse this trend, 
the gap between the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ 
side of global governance is set to widen. Inno-
vation is quietly happening but the capacities of 
the current institutional patchwork – however 
much bolstered by increasing non-state support 
and regional mechanisms – will be stretched by 
the type of challenges facing the global order 
over the next few decades. 
Several clusters of problems – such as global fi-
nancial imbalances, failing states, climate change, 
and resource scarcity – may not be effectively 
tackled without major governance reforms. All 
involve more preventive action, which in turn 
requires shared assessment of these challenges 
and closer monitoring of the implementation of 
(international and national) measures.
Reforming global governance regimes and prac-
tices takes time, and decisions – once adopted 
(or not) at multilateral level – have long-term 
consequences: the political investment is ‘locked 
in’. This is why it is essential to take a long-term 
view of the challenges to be confronted and of 
the positions and priorities of key stakeholders. 
No lasting solution to global challenges will be 
achieved without the participation of critical 
power centres from all regions. 
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In the wake of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, it seems worth reviewing the present ar-
rangements for the institutional representation of 
the EU in international organisations, negotia-
tions, and conventions of international law. This 
is what a research working group – including 
CEPS, EPC, Egmont and the the University of 
Leuven – has recently set out to do.
The subject is ripe for two reasons. First, while 
the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty enhance 
the international role of the EU, modalities for 
external representation remain to be followed 
through. With the EU having acquired interna-
tional legal personality, the nameplate “European 
Union” has replaced that of “European Com-
mission” in various fora. This marks the point 
where the EU as such becomes more of a ‘state-
like’ entity. Beyond the nameplate symbolism, 
however, many complex and substantive issues 
still need to be tackled. 
The complexity follows from the growth of 
EU competences in the numerous treaty revi-
sions since the 1980s, and their multiple legal 
and institutional formats: exclusive and shared 
competences, the three pillar structure (revised 
to two by Lisbon), the "mixed agreements", 
and so on. The Union’s enlargement, also, has 
made various aspects of the status quo increas-
ingly cumbersome and obsolete: constituencies 
on the IMF board that mix EU and non-EU 
states; or the numerical dominance of the EU 
member states in the Council of Europe and 
OSCE, coupled with weak observer status for 
the Union as such.
Second, there is the question of how the EU can 
advance its declared objective of “effective mul-
tilateralism”. It is increasingly apparent that the 
EU has now to reshape its external representa-
tion in order not to prejudice this objective. 
Moreover, new emerging powers want to gain 
adequate recognition and clout in multilateral 
and global for a: the recent Brazil-Russia-India-
China (BRIC) summit in April 2010 was explicit 
on this point. And the over-representation of 
EU member states in those fora is the other side 
of this same coin, and needs to be addressed. 
What for
The EU’s concerns are thus part of the broader 
international search for more effective global 
governance. The UN system now has nearly 200 
members, with the EU programmed to enlarge 
further (at least in the Balkans) from 27 to over 
30. These large numbers make decision-making 
unwieldy unless there are two- or multi-tier 
structures, analogous to the governance of big 
companies which have many sovereign share-
holders, a more limited board of directors and, 
more often than not, an even more restricted 
executive committee. The G7-8/20 and UN Se-
curity Council are the most important examples 
of selected groups, but the former are only semi-
institutionalized and ad hoc, whereas the latter is 
limited in its scope. 
In any case, the EU and its member states will 
have a large responsibility for helping (or block-
ing) developments towards a more effective mul-
tilateral order. Some US analysts who take a pes-
simistic view of the capacity of the multilateral 
organizations to adapt argue for a "mini-lateral" 
rather than multilateral system, i.e. for shifting 
the main action in international affairs to tar-
geted coalitions of small numbers of relevant and 
like-minded countries. If this were to become a 
major trend, how would the EU and its members 
work with it?
While the EU institutions and the member states 
are busy with the first and most obvious steps in 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, start-
ing with the creation of the European External 
Action Service, there is growing awareness that 
these issues of external representation will have 
to be confronted at some stage.
What is still lacking is a systematic review of the 
current state of play and, in particular, a coherent 
rationale for strengthening the EU’s presence in 
2 What external representation for the EU
By Michael Emerson* and Piotr Maciej Kaczynski**
* Michael Emerson is Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels.
** Piotr Maciej Kaczynski is Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels.
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line with its (new) competences. The starting 
point is of course the Lisbon Treaty, namely 
those articles which concern foreign and security 
policy and those which catalogue the compe-
tences of the Union (TFEU Articles 3, 4, 5, 6) by 
graduating them. In the table below we repro-
duce the listing of EU competences of these sev-
eral types and locate selected international or-
ganizations and conventions within those catego-
ries – to provide some initial guidance. 
Who sits where
There are indeed several types of representation 
of the EU and its member states (MS) on the 
international stage. Just to sketch the main ones:
All MS as full members, EU/EC as observer. This is 
the most prevalent model within global multilat-
eral organizations. However, this does not pre-
vent EU institutional representatives from con-
certing more or less informally with their oppo-
site numbers without the presence of the mem-
ber states (e.g. Council of Europe, IFIs); 
All MS plus EU/EC as full members. Where EU 
competences are particularly important, such as 
in trade (WTO) and agriculture (FAO), the Com-
mission has a full status alongside the member 
states; 
Some MS plus EU/EC as full participants. This is 
prevalent in less formalized bodies (e.g. G7-
8/20) where the larger member states are present 
alongside the EU as (more or less) full partici-
pant with both the Council Presidency and the 
Commission; 
EU/EC as full participant/contracting party, no MS. 
This is mostly the case with highly specialized 
international agreements for individual agricul-
tural commodities or metals;
Some MS as full members, EU/EC no status. The 
UN Security Council is a special case with two 
EU countries (F, UK) as permanent members, 
up to three others being elected on a rotational 
but occasional basis, while the Union is not even 
an observer. The Lisbon Treaty, however, pro-
vides for EU representatives to be invited and 
express common positions. The EU has no 
status at the World Bank either, and only the 
European Central Bank has partial observer 
status at the IMF;
Constituency arrangements and voting weights. In some 
organizations (e.g. IMF, EBRD) there are so-
called "constituency" arrangements for clustering 
the smaller member states in ad hoc groups. This 
often raises the issue of allocating voting weights 
internally and, now, also that of including all new 
EU members.
Who negotiates for whom
The question of who negotiates for the EU is 
related to (but not fully coincident with) the issue 
of membership in multilateral organizations. Ar-
ticles 216-219 of the TFEU set out in detail pro-
cedures for the Council to give negotiating man-
dates to the negotiator and entrust the Commis-
sion or the High Representative to make recom-
mendations for who should be the negotiator. 
Yet they do not fully clarify who (i.e. what kind 
of figure) such negotiator should be. 
The most complex situations arise where the EU 
and the member states have shared competences, 
or there is a mix of exclusive and shared compe-
tences. There are cases where such arrangements 
have been worked out in an apparently satisfac-
tory manner. For example in the FAO, at meet-
ings with multiple agenda points, the EC/EU 
and the member states declare at the beginning 
who is competent for what between Commis-
sion, and member states. 
There are, however, other organizations and con-
ventions where the EU has shared competences 
and where the current state of affairs is either messy 
or uncertain. In some cases, new solutions are cur-
rently being tested – in light also of the Lisbon 
Treaty – for possible changes in the distribution of 
roles between the institutions, for example in the 
field of environment and climate change and the 
UNEP-Mercury negotiations.
It would be premature to draw precise conclu-
sions for a project which is still at an initial stage. 
The ambition is to present a strategic review of 
the issue and set out what the EU would need to 
do to in order to be adequately equipped – in 
terms of both presence and influence – as a 
global player. In general, this will require an ex-
tensive "upgrade" of the external representation 
of the Union, which often languishes with rank 
of observer even where its competences may be 
substantial.
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Competences Organisations and Conventions Status of EC & Member States
Foreign, security and de-
fence policies (including ge-
neral political affairs)
UN General Assembly
UN Security Council
OSCE
NATO
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Council of Europe
G7/8/20
EC observer, MS members
2 MS perm. + up to 3 MS rotating
EC observer, MS members
24 MS
EAEC signatory & MS
EC observer, MS members
EC participant, some MS
1. Exclusive (Art.3)
A. Customs union World Customs Organization (WCO) Member 
B. Competition policy World Intellectual Property Org. (WIPO) Observer
C. Monetary policy (for euro 
zone)
IMF
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
OECD
ECB observer, MS members
ECB on Board, some MS
EC observer, 21 MS members
D. Fisheries &marine biologi-
cal policies
Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas
UN Conference on Highly Migratory Fish
Multiple regional fisheries organizations: 
Mediterranean, NE Atlantic, NW Atlantic, 
SE Atlantic, Antarctic, Western and Central 
Pacific
Organizations for species: 
tuna, salmon
EC & MS members
EC & MS members
EC Member & some MS
EC signatory & some MS
E. Trade policy WTO
UN Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)
EC & MS members
EC observer, some MS members
2. Shared (Art.4) 
A. Internal market International Standards Organization (ISO)
Codex Alimentarius Commission
EC cooperation, MS members
EU & MS members
B. Social policy International Labour Organization (ILO) EC observer, MS members
C. Cohesion (regional)
D. Agriculture and Forestry FAO
IFAD
Multiple product organizations: olive oil, sugar, 
cocoa, coffee, jute, tropical timber, rubber, 
grains, new varieties of plants
EC & MS members
EC observer, MS members
EC & some MSmembers
E. Environment UN Environmental Program
UN FCCC (climate change)
Kyoto Protocol
UN Conference on Environm. and Dev.
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea
International Seabed Authority
Protection Marine Environ. of N. Atlantic
Protection of the Danube River
EC observer, some MS members
EC & MS members
EC & MS members
EC & MS full participants
EC & MS members
EC & MS members
EC & MS members
EC & 12 MS members
EC & 6 MS members
EU representation in international bodies
Table prepared by CEPS
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Competences Organisations and Conventions Status of EC & Member States
I. Energy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Energy Agency (IEA)
Energy Charter Treaty
EC observer, MS members
EC participates, 17 MS members
EC and MS members
J. Freedom, security
and justice
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
International Criminal Court (ICC)
European Convention of Human Rights
UN High Commission for Refugees
World Conf. against Racism/Racial Discr.
Fourth World Confeence on Women
UN Convention against Illicit Drugs Traffic
UN Convention against Transnat. Crime
-
EU cooperation agreement
EU & all MS acceding parties
EC observer, MS members
EC & MS full participants
EC & MS full participants
EC & MS full members
EC & MS full members
K. Public health, safety - -
L. Research, Technology, 
Space
International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)
Outer Space Treaty
World Summit on the Information Society
International Fusion Energy Org. (ITER)
Science and Technical Center in Ukraine
EC sector memb, MS members
EC observer, most MS members
EC & MS full participants
EAEC member, no MS
EAEC & EC member, no MS
M. Development 
and humanitarian aid
World Bank
World Food Programme (WFP)
UNDP
UNCTAD
World Summit on Sustainable Development
UN Conference on Least Dev. Countries
World Food Summit
-
EC & many MS donors
EC observer, MS members
EC observer & partial member
EC & most MS full participants
EC & most MS full participants
EC & most MS members
3. Coordination (Art.5) 
A. Economic policies EBRD
OECD
EEC & MS shareholders
EC observer, 21 MS members
B. Employment policies ILO EC observer, MS members
C. Social policies ILO EC observer, MS members
4. Supplementary (Art.6) 
A. Human health World Health Organization (WHO)
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
EC observer, MS members
EC observer, MS members
B. Industry UN Industrial Development Org. (UNIDO)
Multiple Organizations for commodities: nickel, 
copper, lead and zinc
Partnership, most MS members
EC & some MS members
C. Culture UNESCO EC observer, MS members
D. Tourism UN World Tourism Organization Most MS members
E. Education, training, youth, 
sport
UNESCO
UNICEF
EC observer, MS members
EC observer; MS members
H. Trans-Eur. Networks - -
G. Transport International Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO)
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Eurocontrol
EC observer, MS members
EC observer, MS members
EC & 21 MS members
F. Consumer protect. - -
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Events
On 19 June, on the occasion of the launch of the 
new programme on Global Governance of the 
European University Institute in Fiesole, BEPA 
co-organised with the EUI a closed seminar on 
"What should the EU agenda for global govern-
ance be?". 
Commission President Barroso, who participated 
in the Seminar and delivered the programme's 
Inaugural Lecture the day before, agreed with 
EUI President Josep Borrell and Director-
General Jean-Claude Thebault that the Institute 
and BEPA would further collaborate on the new 
programme.
Activities in the pipeline
On 30 June BEPA organises – jointly with DG 
COMP, DG TRADE, DG ECFIN and DG 
TAXUD – the 18th Micro-economic Jacque-
min Seminar. Devoted to "Presenting global 
economic solutions for a better world", the 
Seminar will host Professor Dennis J. Snower 
and Dr. Alessio Brown from the Kiel Institute 
for the World Economy. This seminar series 
was launched by BEPA in 2005 to provide a 
forum for bringing together top economists 
from the academia and the relevant Commis-
sion DGs.
On 9 July BEPA organises – in cooperation with 
the Church and Society Commission of the Con-
ference of European Churches (CSC/CEC) and 
the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of 
the European Community (COMECE) – a Dia-
logue/Seminar on "Combating poverty and so-
cial exclusion in the framework of the EU 2020 
strategy".
On 19 July, BEPA organises a dedicated meeting 
with religious leaders, in line with previous initia-
tives launched by President Barroso since 2005. 
This year the event – which will be co-chaired by 
the President of the European Parliament, Jerzy 
Buzek, and by the President of the Council, Her-
man Van Rompuy – will be devoted to 
“Combating poverty and social exclusion”. For 
the first time, not only the leaders of the three 
monotheistic religions, but also sikh and hindu 
communities will take part.
Research
Following a workshop on social innovation or-
ganised for the President in 2009, BEPA is in the 
process of finalising a report recommending up 
to 40 measures to create a more enabling envi-
ronment for social innovations. These are social 
in both their ends and means: they offer ways to 
alleviate the negative impacts of the crisis on the 
most vulnerable populations, to address societal 
challenges, and to favour fundamental changes in 
attitudes and values, strategies and policies, 
structures and processes. 
Social innovations are not a panacea but, if encour-
aged and enforced, they can help give short term 
solutions to some of the pressing issues European 
citizens are confronted with. In the longer term, 
they should be seen as part of the new culture of 
empowerment that the Commission already pro-
motes in different policy fields.
After sketching the political and economic back-
ground for such an initiative, the draft report sug-
gest a definition of what social innovation is and 
what it is not; looks at the characteristics and barri-
ers which social innovators confront; and presents 
an inventory of actions taken by the Commission 
which have supported such innovations so far. The 
pressing demand from stakeholders and think tanks 
working on this issue is to see social innovation 
recognised at top political level to make it easier 
then to act at every level, get funding, facilitate net-
working, and scale up ventures. 
The draft report also suggests an initiative which 
could entail up to 40 measures to improve the gov-
ernance, the funding, the "enabling" of (and the 
research on) social innovation. Some could be im-
plemented straight away, while some others need 
further preparation and negotiation. These meas-
ures are organised around the three approaches to 
social innovation (social demands, societal chal-
lenge and systemic change) which correspond to 
the three pillars of Europe 2020 for an inclusive, 
green and smart Europe.
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